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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the denial of an LC.R. 33 motion to withdraw guilty plea and from 
a resentencing after an I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence was granted. 
B. Statement of Facts and Proceedings. 
1. Backgronnd. 
Robert Peterson pleaded guilty to four counts of Possession of Sexually Exploitative 
Material For Other Than a Commercial Purpose. LC.§ 18-1507A. On December 4, 2006, the 
court imposed a five-year sentence with three years fixed on count 2 and the same sentence as to 
count 5 to run concnrrently with connt 2. The court also imposed a five-year sentence with three 
years fixed on count 6 and the san1e sentence as to count 9 to run concurrently with count 6. The 
sentences in counts 6 and 9 were ordered to run consecutively to the sentences in counts 2 and 5. 
R 3-5. The sentences totaled ten years with six years fixed. Mr. Peterson filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal. R 6. On March 27, 2007, he filed an LC.R. 35 motion to reconsider the sentence, which 
was denied by the district court. The Comt of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished 
opinion, State v. Peterson, No. 33848 (issued November 16, 2007). 
2. Rule 35 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
On November I 9, 2007, Mr. Peterson filed a prose I.C.R. 35 Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence. R 13. In the motion, he alleged his sentence was illegally imposed pursuant to 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 564, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). R 14-15. On March 17, 2008, the District 
Court heard argument on the motion. First, the court stated that "I think what I ought to do here 
is probably appoint an attorney to represent you - a conflict attorney." T (3-17-9009), pg. 9, In. 
1 
7-9. He then entered into a colloquy with Mr. Peterson, without the presence of counsel, asking 
him ifhe wanted to have his "sentence be set aside." Mr. Peterson answered that he did. T (3-
17-2009), pg. 11, ln. 21-25. The state then argued that the comi did not have jurisdiction to rule 
on the motion since the court had denied a previous Rule 35 motion and that the motion was not 
timely. T (3-17-2008), pg. 12, ln. 3 - pg. 13, ln. 2. In response, the coUli stated that it was not 
sure if Mr. Peterson could file a second Rule 3 5 motion, but granted the motion and vacated the 
sentence with the proviso that if it did not have the jnrisdiction to consider a Rule 35 motion it 
would construe the pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief. T (3-17-2008), pg. 14, In. 21 
- pg. 15, In. 25. 
The court then suggested that Mr. Peterson might want to disqualify the court from 
resentencing him. "In all fairness to, since I have read the psychosexual evaluation without your 
being advised of your rights. You would probably move to want me to disqualify myself?" Mr. 
Peterson responded, "I appreciate that self-disqualification. Yes sir, I would make that motion." 
Judge McDern1ott granted the motion and assigned the case to Judge Harding. T (3-17-2009), 
pg. 16, In. 4-10; R 34. 
The court later clarified its order stating that it was considering the prose motion an 
I.C.R. 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. It wrote: 
R44. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's request to 
modify its previous Minute Entry and Order to reflect to have his sentence set 
aside as a valid Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence and not as a motion 
for post conviction relief. Because a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be 
submitted at any time and is not limited to one filing, the Defendant's motion to 
set aside his illegal sentence was granted pursuant to Rule 35. 
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3. Motion to Disqualify Judge and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
On March 26, 2008, Mr. Peterson filed a motion to disqualify Judge Harding pursuant to 
I.C.R. 25(a). R 37. The court denied this motion because it found that Mr. Peterson "ha[d] 
already disqualified one judge pursuant to ICR 25(a)." R 39. Mr. Peterson moved for 
reconsideration. R 48. 
He also filed an Amended Motion to Withdraw Plea. He argued that he need only show a 
"just reason" to withdraw his plea as the motion was made prior to sentencing, and that granting 
the motion would not prejudice the state. R 61. 1 However, the basis for the withdrawal actually 
went to the higher "manifest injustice" standard. He argued that "counsel [did not] adequately 
explain the charges, evidence, facts and circumstances of the case with him to allow Mr. Peterson 
to make an info1med decision." And further, the colloquies between the Court and Mr. Peterson 
were inadequate to meet the requirements ofI.C.R. l l(c). Therefore, the record did not show 
that the plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Finally, Mr. Peterson argued 
that there was a just cause to withdraw the plea because both court and counsel failed to explain 
to him that a guilty plea to the charges would require him to register as a sex offender. R 63. 
On May 15, 2008, the court heard Mr. Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration on the 
Motion to Disqualify and a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. T (5-15-2008) pg. 1, In. 13-16. 
1 Mr. Peterson anticipates that the state may argue that the original sentence was not an 
illegal sentence for purposes of Rule 35. See State v. Alsanea, 138 ldaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 
165 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision 
or otherwise contrary to applicable law."). And, therefore, Mr. Peterson's Rule 33 motion is 
untimely. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003). However, the Order granting 
the Rule 35 may not be challenged by the state on appeal because it did not file a cross appeal. 
See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372,377, 195 P.3d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 2008) (State's 
argument seeking affirmative relief on defendant's appeal, without having filed a cross-appeal, is 
not permissible unless the issue raised is one of subject matter jurisdiction.). 
3 
Mr. Peterson argued that his motion to reconsider should be granted because: 1) Judge 
McDermott actuaJly voluntarily disqualified himself from further consideration under I.C.R. 
25(d) and the LC.R. 25(a) motion to disqualify Judge Harding without cause was therefore not 
the second such motion; 2) that Judge McDermott was required to disqualify himself under 
LC.R. 25(b) because he had read the sentencing material obtained in violation of Estrada; and 3) 
Mr. Peterson's acquiescence in Judge McDermott's suggestion should not be binding because 
Mr. Peterson was acting prose and appointed counsel would not have used the LC.R. 25(a) 
motion to disqualify Judge McDermott, as the judge was plainly going to disqualify himself. T 
(5-15-2008) pg. 2, In. 3 - pg. 4, In. 4. These arguments were based upon the transcript of the 
March 7, 2008, hearing described above, which was placed into the record. R 67-72. 
The court denied the motion to reconsider. It found that Judge McDermott was not 
required to disqualify himself and that Mr. Peterson made the motion to disqualify Judge 
McDermott. T (5-15-2008) pg. 4, ln. 8 - pg. 5, ln. 6. 
Mr. Peterson then argued his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He first argued "his 
counsel didn't explain any of his offense to him. Didn't explain the charges, the evidence, the 
facts, the circumstances of the case, and therefore couldn't make an informed decision." T (5-15-
2008) pg. 10, ln. 10-23. Further, he suggested that the trial transcript raised a question of 
whether the trial court complied with LC.R. l l(c). T (5-15-2008) pg. 11, In. 6-12. He also 
argued that the plea should be withdrawn because he was not informed that a guilty plea would 
require him to register as a sex offender. T (5-15-2008) pg. 10, ln. 10-13. 
The court also denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. It found that based upon 
"what happened at the time he entered that plea of guilty," there was no just reason to allow Mr. 
4 
Peterson to withdraw his pleas. T (5-15-2008) pg. 21, In. 12 - pg. 24, ln. 9. 
4. Sentencing. 
After denying the above motions, the court proceeded to sentencing. It imposed a five-
year sentence with two years fixed on each of the four counts with each sentence to be served 
consecutively to the others. T(5-15-2008)pg. 56, ln. 1-3. This, in effect, doubled the 
indeterminate sentence previously imposed. While Judge McDennott' s combined sentence was 
ten years with six years fixed, Judge Harding's sentence is twenty years with eight years fixed. 
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 79. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A Did the court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea as the plea was not 
constitutionally valid and as there was a just reason to grant the motion? 
B. Did the court violate Mr. Peterson's state and federal constitutional rights to the 
assistance of counsel when it granted Mr. Peterson's prose "motion" to disqualify Judge 
McDermott in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel? 
C. Did the court err in denying the motion to disqualify Judge Harding without cause as 
the prior "motion" to disqualify Judge McDermott was not an I.C.R. 25(a) motion? 
D. Did the court violate Mr. Peterson's due process rights under the state and federal 
constitutions by increasing his sentence after he was successful in his Rule 35 motion? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea. 
l. Standard of Review. 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
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State v. Litz, 122 Idaho 387,388,834 P.2d 904, 905 (Ct. App. 1992). When a defendant seeks to 
withdraw a guilty plea, the first question is whether the plea was constitutionally valid. If not, 
withdrawal should be granted. "If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due 
process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently, then 'manifest injustice' or the lower standard of 'just reason' will be established as 
a matter of law." State v. Stone, - Idaho-, - P.3d-, 2009 WL 689878 *2 (Ct. App. 2009) 
citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007); State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 
858, 859, 172 P.3d 1133, 1134 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 
879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002). But even in cases where the plea was constitutionally valid, the court 
must go on to decide whether withdrawal should nevertheless be allowed as a matter of 
discretion. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512,516, 861 P.2d 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. State, 
118 Idaho 842, 844, 801 P.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990). "[A] constitutional defect in the plea is not 
necessary in order to show either a 'just reason' or 'manifest injustice.'" Stone, supra, citing 
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Henderson, 113 
Idaho 411,413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1987). 
If a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of the plea, the motion should be 
granted unless the state demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 
799, 802, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988), citing State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 744 P.2d 795 
(Ct. App. 1987) ("In granting or denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing 
has occurred, the district court is empowered with broad discretion, liberal exercise of which is 
encouraged." 113 Idaho at 414, 744 P.2d at 798 (citations omitted).) A motion made after 
sentencing may be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 
6 
Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1988). 
In reviewing a district court decision for an abuse of discretion, "the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the comi reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hanslovan, -
Idaho-, -P.3d- 2008 WL 2512529 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
In this case, the district court abused its discretion by failing to act "consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it" and by failing to reach "its decision 
by an exercise of reason." Id. In particular, the District Court reviewed only the guilty plea 
questionnaire and concluded that "because a person doesn't like what happened at sentencing, or 
what happens in the recommendation ofa Presentence Repo1i, isn't a just cause, and I don't 
believe there is any just cause reason." T (5-15-2008) pg. 23, ln, 14 - pg. 24, ln. 9. 
(a) Mr. Peterson established that a manifest injustice would result if the motion was not 
granted. 
The District Court did not go beyond the guilty plea questionnaire to determine whether 
the record as a whole showed there was a constitutionally valid plea. Had it done so, it would 
have found that Mr. Peterson was never info1med of the nature of the charge against him as 
required by I.C.R l l(c)(4). 
The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that a defendant's 
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plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 
(1969) (Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 35, 557 P.2d 626,629 (1976). 
Therefore, a plea must be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 857, 702 P.2d 893, 895 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Moreover, the record must disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered 
his pleas of guilty. Boykin, supra. To that end, the trial court must follow the minimum 
requirements ofidaho Criminal Rule 11 ( c) before accepting guilty pleas. 
More particularly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plea of guilty cannot 
be voluntary unless the defendant receives "real notice of the true nature of the charge against 
him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976), quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). A plea 
of guilty that is not voluntary cannot support a judgment of conviction. Henderson v. Morgan, 
supra. Here, however, the record does not show that Mr. Peterson was ever informed of the 
nature of the charge against him. Mr. Peterson waived his preliminary hearing. R (#33848) 59. 
(A motion for judicial notice of the clerk's record and transcripts in State v. Robert Peterson, 
Docket No. 33848 is filed contemporaneously with this brief.) He waived the reading of the 
reading of the Information at arraignment. T (9-18-2006) pg. 7, In. 24-pg. 25, In. 2. The court's 
guilty plea questionnaire did not advise Mr. Peterson of the nature of the charge, nor did he admit 
therein he had been so infonned by his attorney or anyone else. R (#33848) 68-69. Finally, the 
district court did not inform him at the change of plea hearing. T (10-16-2006) pg. 7, In. 1 - pg. 
20, In. 5. 
While Mr. Peterson read the prosecutor's information before the plea, that alone is not 
8 
sufficient to give him notice of the nature of the charge. As to the four counts Mr. Peterson 
pleaded guilty to, the infmmation generically states: "That the said ROBERT E. PETERSON, a 
person over the age of eighteen, in the County of Bannock, State ofidaho, on or about the 25th [or 
22nd] day of February, 2006, did knowingly and willfully possess sexually exploitative material, 
to wit: movie clip, for other than a commercial purpose." R (#33848) 64-65. Nowhere does the 
information provide notice to Mr. Peterson of what "sexually exploitative materials" are and the 
term itself is not so clear as to give notice without such an explanation. See United States v. 
Wetter/in, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that charge of"conspiracy" is not a 
self-explanatory legal term so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that a lay 
person understands it); accord United States v. Darling, 766 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1992) (Brief and vague explanation of the 
information, by the court, did not satisfy requirement that defendant be infom1ed of the nature of 
the charge to which the plea is offered.). 
In fact, the nature of a conspiracy charge is straightforward and easily understandable 
when compared to the nature of "sexually exploitative material." Idaho Code § 18-1507 A(2), the 
charge here, does not even define the term, instead referring to the definition "in section 18-
1507." Subsection (2)(k) of that statute provides that "'[s]exually exploitative material' means 
any photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, 
electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material which depicts a child engaged in, 
participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct." (Emphasis added.) 
"Explicit sexual conduct" is defined in subsection (f) as: "sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, 
erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality." (Emphasis added.) 
9 
Then each of the italicized tenns is given its own definition. LC.§ 18-1507(2)(a), (d)-G).2 
In light of the complex nature of the offense, it cannot be said that the record shows that 
Mr. Peterson was informed of the nature of the charge merely because he had read the 
prosecutor's information. As the Wetter/in Court observed, the defendant "reading the 
indictment clearly does nothing to establish on the record that the court personally detennined 
2 The term "sexual intercourse" is defined as "real or simulated intercourse, whether 
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, between persons of the same or opposite 
sex, or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital." 
"Erotic fondling" is defined as 
touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals or pubic area, developing or 
undeveloped genitals or pubic area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if 
the person is a female), or developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is 
a female child), for the purpose ofreal or simulated overt sexual gratification or 
stimulation of one (1) or more of the persons involved. 'Erotic fondling' shall not 
be construed to include physical contact, even if affectionate, which is not for the 
purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation of one (1) or 
more of the persons involved. 
"Erotic nudity" is defined as 
the display of the human male or female genitals or pubic area, the undeveloped 
or developing genitals or pubic area of the human male or female child, the human 
female breasts, or the undeveloped or developing breast area of the human female 
child, for the purpose ofreal or simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation 
of one (1) or more of the persons involved. 
"Masturbation" is defined as 
the real or simulated touching, rubbing, or otherwise stimulating of a person's own 
clothed or unclothed genitals or pubic area, developing or undeveloped genitals or 
pubic area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if the person is a female), or 
developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is a female child), by manual 
manipulation or self-induced or with an artificial instrument, for the purpose of 
real or simulated oveit sexual gratification or arousal of the person. 
"Sadomasochism" is defined as the: 
(i) Real or simulated flagellation or torture for the purpose of real or simulated 
sexual stimulation or gratification; or 
(ii) The real or simulated condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise 
physically restrained for sexual stimulation or gratification of a person. 
"Sexual excitement" means "the real or simulated condition of human male or female genitals 
when in a state of real or simulated overt sexual stimulation or arousal." Finally, "'Bestiality' 
means a sexual connection in any manner between a human being and any animal." 
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that the defendant understood the nature of the charges." 583 F.2d at 350, n. 6. Federal Courts 
in implementing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 agree that the mere reading of an 
indictment will usually not suffice to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense. See, e.g., 
United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471,473 (5th Cir. 1979). "To inform a defendant of the 
nature of the charge must mean more than having the indictment read to the defendant. Reading 
the indictment informs the defendant of the technical charge. . . . . In most cases only the most 
sophisticated defendant would be informed of the nature of the charge by a reading of the 
indictment without more." United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1978). "Charges 
of a complex nature, including esoteric terms unfamiliar to the lay mind, may require more 
explication" by the bench. United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931,938 (5th Cir. 1979), 
superseded by rule change on other grounds as stated in United States v. Johnson, I F.3d 296 
(5th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the court here did not comply with I.C.R.l l(c)(4) and the plea is 
constitutionally invalid. Therefore, Mr. Peterson established both a "manifest injustice" and a 
"just reason" as a matter oflaw. State v. Stone, supra. See also State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 
432, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that where a guilty plea is shown to be 
constitutionally invalid, leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated). 
(b) Mr. Peterson established a just reason to grant the motion. 
After erroneously determining the guilty plea was valid, the district court did not go on to 
consider Mr. Peterson's other arguments why a just reason to withdraw the plea existed. This 
failure to even consider the claims was an abuse of discretion because the court did not reach its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Further, the error was not harmless because there was a just 
reason to grant the motion as the record shows that Mr. Peterson was not informed that a guilty 
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plea would result in him being required to register as a sex offender. There was no such 
advisement by the court at the arraignment or change of plea hearing; nor was there one in the 
guilty plea questionnaire. 
Mr. Peterson acknowledges that in 2006, the time of the change of plea here, Idaho 
Courts were not required to inform defendants that a plea of guilty might trigger sex offender 
registration requirements. LC.R. 11 (2006); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,982 P.2d 931 (1999) (the 
duty to register as a sex offender is a collateral, not a direct consequence of a guilty plea). That 
changed in 2007 when the Supreme Court amended I.C.R. 11 to add the requirement that "[t]he 
district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a 
plea colloquy, instruct on the following .... (2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense 
requiring registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such 
registration requirements." I.C.R. l l(d)(2). And, that was the rule in effect at the time of the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In sum, while such advisement was not 
required in 2006, the failure to so advise is still a just reason to permit withdrawal in 2008. 
The above is confirmed by the history of the rule change. In 2006, the Criminal Rules 
Advisory Committee "recommend[ ed] to the Supreme Court the adoption of an amendment to 
Rule 11 to read as follows: 
( d) The district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of 
factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of the following 
collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or factual admissions, as follows: 
(1) The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is not a citizen 
of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions could 
have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the 
United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship. Failure of 
the court to provide this notice shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty 
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(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring registration on 
the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such notification 
requirements. Failure to so notify the defendant shall not be grounds for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
(3) If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other post-conviction 
proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of the plea has been 
called to the attention of the court, the court shall confinn with the defendant his 
awareness of the waiver of appeal or other proceedings. Failure of the court to 
confirm this waiver with the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise 
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand the 
conditions of his plea agreement. 
Minutes of the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee from November 13, 2006 (attached hereto as 
Appendix A for the convenience of Court and counsel) (underlining added). Thus, the 
Committee's proposal was to advise defendants of the sex offender registration requirement, but 
not to allow the failure to advise to become a basis to withdraw the guilty plea. However, the 
Supreme Court rejected the Committee's suggestion and omitted the underlined text from the 
final amended rule. The Supreme Court's rejection of the Advisory Committee's proposed text 
strongly supports the conclusion that the failure to properly advise a defendant of the sex 
offender registration is a just reason to withdraw a plea. See Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
113 Idaho 609,614, 747 P.2d 18, 23 (1987) (When the legislature amends a statute it is deemed, 
absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent.) and 
Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298,299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986) (When a statute is amended it is 
presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a meaning different from the meaning 
accorded the statute before amendment.) 
As the court rejected the notion that a just reason could exist even if a guilty plea was 
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constitutionally valid, it abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper standard to the 
decision before it and because its decision was not made by an exercise of reason. The order 
denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed and the matter remanded. 
B. The Court Deprived Mr. Peterson of the Assistance of Counsel at a Critical Stage of 
the Proceedings When It Elicited a Pro Se "Motion" to Disqualify Judge McDermott and Then 
Granted the Motion. 
1. Standard of Review. 
In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme held that relief must be 
granted under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in three circumstances: (1) where there is a 
"complete denial" of counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) where "counsel entirely fails to subject 
the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing"; and (3) where, "although counsel is 
available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent 
one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate. 
Id. at 659; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002). This case falls into the first 
circumstance. 
The question of whether Mr. Peterson was deprived of his right to counsel was not 
presented below, but this Court should review the claim under the fundamental error doctrine. 
"[T]his Court traditionally has reviewed 'fundamental' errors on appeal, even when no objection 
was raised at trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,486 P.2d 260 (1971). An error is fundamental 
when it 'so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the 
accused of his fundamental right to due process."' State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 
P.3d 886,891 (2007) quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). See 
State v. Yakovac, !45 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d 476,482 (2008) (claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel may be fundamental error, but fundamental error doctrine does not permit appellant from 
relitigating claim already rnled upon in post-conviction petition). 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
When Mr. Peterson filed his Rule 35 motion, he also filed a Motion and Affidavit for 
Appointment of Counsel. R 17-23. On November 19, 2007, the Court appointed the public 
defender and set a December 17, 2007, hearing date. ROA, pg. 5 (in Clerk's Record). On 
December 17, Mr. Peterson appeared with counsel, John Dewey. The court pennitted Mr. Dewey 
to withdraw and appointed attorney John Souza. R 25. A hearing was held without Mr. Peterson 
being present and Mr. Peterson moved to proceed prose. On February 4, 2008, Mr. Souza was 
permitted to withdraw. R 30. 
Judge McDern1ott presided over the LC.R. 35 motion. At the hearing, the court inquired 
as to Mr. Peterson's desire to be represented. 
THE COURT: You have advised this Comi that you don't want an attorney to represent 
you; correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, based on past experience with not being present at a hearing, I 
feel compelled to waive my right to an attorney. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't want you to think you ought to be 
compelled to do anything, you know. The attorneys 
have been trained in the law, Mr. Peterson, and to 
have you represent yourself - you know the old 
saying, don't you? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm very aware of that, yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So -
THE DEFENDANT: And it's usually very apt. And this is a last resort -
THE COURT: Well, I think what I ought to do here is probably appoint you an attorney to 
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represent you - a conflict attorney. 
T (3-17-2008), pg. 8, In. 8 - pg. 9, In. 9. 
The court, however, proceeded to rule on the merits of the Rule 35 motion without counsel 
being present, notwithstanding the absence of a valid waiver. (See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 834 (1975) (While defendant has a iight to self-representation, such a decision amounts to a 
waiver of the right to counsel and therefore the defendant should be made aware of the problems 
inherent in self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.). To 
waive counsel, defendant must "knowingly and intelligently forgo" the benefits of counsel and 
"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record 
will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). Idaho also requires that waiver be effected voluntarily. State v. Dalrymple, 
144 Idaho 628, 167 P.3d 765 (2007); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278,289 
(2003).) The actions of the district comi violated Mr. Peterson's right to counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all 
"critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
224 (1967). In determining whether a particular stage is "critical," it is necessary "to analyze 
whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation 
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1932, 
18 L.Ed.2d at 1157. For example, sentencing has been deemed a critical stage. See e.g., Mempa 
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) and Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792,796,874 P.2d 603,607 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
Here, at the Rule 35 hearing, the Court decided to appoint conflict counsel for Mr. 
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Peterson. T (3-17-2008) pg. 9, In. 7-10. The Court then granted the Rule 35 motion. T (3-17-
2008) pg. 14, In. 22. After doing so and noting that he had already read the psychosexual 
evaluation, Judge McDennott asked whether "you would probably move to want me to disqualify 
myself?" Mr. Peterson responded: "I appreciate that self-disqualification, sir. Yes, sir, I would 
make that motion." The court then said: "Okay sir. I'll disqualify myself from sentencing." T (3-
17-2008) pg. 16, In. 4-16. In doing so, the Court made an important decision while Mr. Peterson 
was not represented by counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
While this constitutional issue was not presented to the trial court, this Court should 
review the claim under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 
170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). The error here was fundamental because the Court will presume 
prejudice when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel in a criminal proceeding. Roe 
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,482 (2000); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Therefore, 
the sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded to Judge McDermott for further 
proceedings. 
C. The Court Further Erred by Denying the Motion to Disqualify Judge Harding and 
the Motion to Reconsider. 
1. Standard of Review. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) provides that "[i]n all criminal cases ... the parties shall each 
have the right to one disqualification without cause of the judge or magistrate[.]" Here, Judge 
Harding denied the Rule 25(a) motion because he found that Mr. Peterson had previously moved 
to disqualify Judge McDennott. T (5-15-2008) pg. 4, In. 18-23 ("The wording in it [Mr. 
Peterson's "motion"] leaves a little bit to be desired but I view that as a motion by Mr. Peterson 
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for Judge McDennott to disqualify himself.") That question is one of law, i.e., whether the 
undisputed facts show a prior I.C.R. 25(a) motion, which this Court should review de novo. See 
State v. Sanchez, - Idaho-, - P.3d-. , 2009 WL 1406996 *2 (Ct. App. 2009) (question of 
law given free review). 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
Judge McDermott's disqualification was actually a voluntary disqualification under I.C.R. 
25( c ). That was certainly how Mr. Peterson interpreted it, as he thanked the judge for 
disqualifying himself. ("I appreciate that self-disqualification, sir. Yes, sir, I would make that 
motion." T (3-17-2008) pg. 16, In. 9-11.) To the extent that Mr. Peterson, who was acting without 
appointed counsel being present, could be said to have made a motion, it was a 25(b )( 4) motion 
for disqualification for bias or prejudice as Judge McDermott had informed him that it would not 
be fair for him to do the resentencing "since I have read the psychosexual evaluation." 
Accordingly, Judge Harding erred in denying the I.C.R. 25(a) motion to disqualify himself 
as Mr. Peterson had not made a prior motion to disqualify without cause. 
D. The Court's Unjustified Increase of the Sentence Should be Vacated Because it is 
Presumptively Vindictive and Violates Due Process. 
As this Court previously found in State v. Peterson, supra, the original sentence in this 
case was not unreasonable. Judge Harding then doubled the indetenninate time from ten to 
twenty years and increased the fixed time by a quarter from six to eight years. The judge, 
however, did not justify the increase in the sentence and the presumption arises that he did so to 
punish Mr. Peterson for successfully challenging the original sentence. This vindictive sentencing 
violated the dne process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court said in North 
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Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969)3, supra: 
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence 
he receives after a new trial. And since fear of such vindictiveness may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally 
attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of 
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. 
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that 
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new 
trial, the reasons for him doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must 
be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of 
the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing. And the factual 
data upon which the increased sentence is based must be part of the record, so that 
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on 
appeal. 
395 U.S. at 725-26 ( emphasis added). 
If the Court does not grant the relief requested above, it still should modify the sentence 
back to the original sentence often years with six years fixed because of the Pearce presumption. 
Judge Harding did not point to any affirmative evidence to justify the higher sentence. There 
being no evidence at all, it follows perforce that the record does not contain objective information 
concerning identifiable conduct occurring after the time of the original sentencing to justify the 
much longer sentence. Compare State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527,530, 850 P.2d 176, 179 (1993). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas and remand for a trial. Alternatively, the court should vacate the 
sentences due to the e1Tors regarding the disqualification of the judges and remand for further 
proceedings. As a second alternative, this Court should reinstate Judge McDermott's original 
3 Overruled in other circumstances in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
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sentences. 
Respectfully submitted this l ~ day of June, 2009. 
llitA-R K4v1.~:-,, 
Dennis B~njamin 
Attorney for Robert Peterson 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
s;r 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\ _ day of June, 2009, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-0010. 
D .eAv,,'3. ~ e ~ c;,--<-
Dennis Benjamin J 
21 
APPENDIX A 
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee 
Minutes from Meeting of November 13, 2006 
Present: Justice Roger Burdick, Chair; Judge Penny Friedlander, Judge Stephen 
Calhoun, Judge James Cawthon, Am1 Marie Kelso, Ken Jorgensen, Scott Axline, Art 
Bistline, Gar Hackney, Denise Rosen, Amil Myshin, Roger Bourne, Molly Huskey, Sara 
Thomas, Grant Loebs, and Cathy Derden. 
Plea Advisories. At its last meeting in January, the Committee considered whether the 
court should be required to advise defendants of certain collateral consequences of their 
plea of guilty before taking the plea; specifically, the chance of deportation and the 
requirement to register as a sex offender. The Committee came to a consensus that this 
should be done and appointed a subcommittee chaired by Judge Cawthon to draft a 
specific proposal for presentation at this meeting. 
In addition, Monica Schurtman, the supervising attorney for the Immigration Clinic at the 
University of Idaho College of Law, sent in a proposal that she and her students had 
drafted, addressing an advisory on immigration consequences that would be given both at 
arraignment and at the time of entering the plea. At the invitation of Justice Burdick, 
Professor Schurtman attended the meeting along with Maria Andrade, a local attorney 
who handles immigration cases, to discuss immigration issues that arise from entering a 
plea of guilty to ce1iain offenses. 
In 1996 and 1997 Congress expanded the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction and expanded the definition of a conviction to include convictions that were 
expunged, as well as factual admissions made in connection with a charge even if there 
was no conviction on that charge. The list of what is considered an aggravated felony for 
deportation purposes is vast so that even climes that are considered misdemeanors under 
state law and that carry only a minor penalty or no jail time may still be included. Both 
Schurtman and Andrade stated they had handled cases where persons had plead guilty to 
crimes and later been deported, without ever having been advised or having realized the 
consequences of their pleas. Andrade argued a post-conviction case on this issue last 
week and both see it as an issue that is being raised more frequently. 
The proposal by the Immigration law Clinic was first to amend Rule 10 on arraigrrments 
by adding a new subsection ( c) as follows: 
(c) Notice of possible immigration consequences. 
At the time of criminal arraignment, each defendant shall be informed 
that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of any 
plea or making of any factual admission may affect his or her 
immigration status. In each case, including those involving 
misdemeanor charges, the court shall advise each defendant of his or 
her right to consult with au attorney if he or she needs additional 
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information concerning the potential immigration consequences of his 
or her criminal case. 
The purpose of advising at arraignment would be to let persons know of this possible 
consequence early in the process. In addition, in many counties indigent defendants may 
go to arraignment without an attorney and if it's a misdemeanor where the court is not 
going to impose jail time may be asked if they wish to plead at that time. This happens 
without the person ever realizing the offense may be one that carries immigration 
consequences. Giving this advisory at arraignment would help alert defendants and 
attorneys to the issue. Another reason for advising at this state is that factual admissions 
made at this time may lead to deportation or an inability to naturalize even if the person 
is not convicted. 
The Committee later voted against the proposal to amend Rule 10. The Committee first 
struck the second sentence, noting subsection (b) of the rule already advised the 
defendant of the right to an attorney. The Committee then discussed that if the concern is 
that persons might plead guilty without an advisory then that should be remedied by the 
fact that the Committee intended to recommend that an advisory on immigration 
consequences be given before a plea is taken. If at that time the person realizes more 
time is needed to talk to an attorney before pleading then the defendant can request more 
time. 
The Immigration Law Clinic submitted three proposals for amendments to Rule 11 on 
plea advisories. 
Proposal I is based on an Arizona statute and sets out the exact wording of the advisory. 
It also provides for the defendant to have time to reconsider the appropriateness of the 
plea in light of the advisement. It would be a new subsection that reads as follows: 
( d) Prior to acceptance of any plea to an offense punishable as a 
crime, the court shall administer the following advisal on the record 
to the defendant: 
"If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are advised that 
conviction of any criminal offense, including conviction by entry of 
any plea, and even where the conviction is later expunged, may have 
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the 
United States." 
(e) Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a reasonable 
amount of additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea 
in light of the advisement. If the court fails to advise the defendant as 
required by subsection ( d) and the defendant shows that conviction of 
the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty may have the 
consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from the 
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United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the 
United States, the court, on defendant's motion, shall vacate the 
judgment aud permit the defendant to withdraw the plea and enter a 
plea of not guilty. Absent record that the court provided the 
advisement required by subsection ( d), the defendant shall be 
presumed not to have received the required advisement. At uo time is 
the defendant required to disclose his or her immigration status. 
Proposal II contains no actual recitation of the advisory and would be a new subsection 
under Rule 11 ( c) on acceptance of a guilty plea that would read as follows: 
(6) Before the court accepts any plea of guilty, the court shall advise 
the defendant that (1) by entering the plea, if the defendant is not a 
United States citizen, the defendant may face additional consequences 
of deportation or removal, detention, exclusion from readmission to 
the United States, or ineligibility for citizenship and (2) that the 
defendant may consult with counsel if the defendant needs additional 
information concerning the potential consequences of the plea or of a 
conviction following trial. At no time is the defendant required to 
disclose his or her immigration status. Failure of the court to provide 
notice regarding potential immigration consequences shall not be 
grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea unless the defendant shows 
he or she is likely to suffer deportation, exclusion of admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization; and the guilty plea or 
factual admission made in the criminal case at issue is likely to be 
considered in relation to such action of deportation, exclusion of 
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization. 
Proposal III is what the clinic considers to be the bare minimum and is a paragraph that 
would come under Rule 11 ( c) on acceptance of a guilty plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including 
minimum and maximum punishments, other direct consequences which 
may apply, and that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, a 
plea or conviction may have immigration consequences. At no time is 
the defendant required to disclose his or her immigration status. 
Failure of the court to provide notice shall not be grounds for 
withdrawal of the plea unless the defendant shows he or she is likely 
to suffer deportation, exclusion of admission to the United States, or 
denial of naturalization; and the guilty plea or factual admission 
made in the criminal case at issue is likely to be considered in relation 
to such action of deportation, exclusion of admission to the United 
States, or denial of naturalization. 
It was noted that once a defendant is advised there might be immigration consequences, 
he or she is going to want to know specifically what those are for his or her offense, and 
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there was concern that defense attorneys would not be able to properly advise on this, 
leading to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Right now it is not considered 
ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to advise as to a collateral consequence. Both 
Schurtman and Andrade advised that there is a trend developing in cases that indicates 
courts are more willing to recognize that even if immigration consequences are 
considered collateral it is still not reasonable for counsel not to tell clients about this 
possibility. Some courts are finding attorneys have a duty to inform since deportation 
leads to loss of jobs and separation of families. They also noted that often attorneys 
never ask a client questions about citizenship, as seen recently in several cases involving 
Canadians. You can be a legal resident and still be deported. 
Molly Huskey advised that the SAPD's office had sent one of their attorneys to training 
on immigration issues and that there were some charts being developed by immigration 
attorneys listing offenses that could be considered as aggravated felonies or crimes of 
moral turpitude. There are also special resource centers that can be contacted for the 
infonnation. 
It was noted by Molly Huskey and Grant Loebs that under a new federal law, the Adams 
Walsh Act, that sex offender registration has been extremely broadened to encompass 
offenses where a minor is involved even if there is no allegation of sexual contact and 
that states are directed to comply. Thus, immigration consequences and sex offender 
registration are both areas that are affecting more people. 
Proposal II is the closest of the three proposals to the proposal presented by the 
subcommittee. The following is the subcommittee's proposal: 
Proposed amendment to I.C.R. 11 
Add: 
( d) The district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the 
making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of 
the following collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or 
factual admissions, as follows: 
(1) The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is 
not a naturalized citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or 
making of factual admissions could have consequences of deportation, 
exclusion of admission to the United States, or denial of 
naturalization. Failure of the court to provide this notice shall not be 
grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea unless the defendant shows 
that the defendant is likely to suffer deportation, exclusion of 
admission to the United States or denial of naturalization; and the 
guilty plea or factual admission made in the criminal case at issue is 
likely to be considered in relation to such action of deportation, 
exclusion of admission to the United States or denial of naturalization. 
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(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense reqmrmg 
registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the 
defendant of such notification requirements. Failure to so notify the 
defendant shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
(3) If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other post-
conviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of 
the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court shall 
confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of appeal or 
other proceedings. Failure of the court to confirm this waiver with 
the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for withdrawal of the 
guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise 
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand 
the conditions of his plea agreement. 
Current subsection (d) would then be re-designated as (e). 
Andrade had several suggestions as to language used in this proposal: 
Strike the word "naturalize" from the first sentence. Use the word "removal" in 
conjunction with the word "deportation". The INS now uses the word "removal" but 
everyone is more familiar with "deportation". Instead of "exclusion of admission to the 
United States" substitute "inability to obtain legal status in the United States". Instead of 
"denial of naturalization" substitute "denial of an application for U.S. citizenship". 
After the presentation, the Committee reviewed the proposals. The Committee feared 
requiring the exact wording of an advisory would lead to too many claims of error. The 
focus then turned to the proposal by the subcommittee that was similar to proposal II 
from the clinic. The Committee voted to accept the changes to the language that were 
proposed by Andrade. 
The proposal from the subcommittee addresses not only immigration consequences but 
also sex offender registration as well as waiver of the right to appeal. Discussion then 
focused on the last sentence in each paragraph dealing with the failure to give the 
advisory. The proposal states that failure to give the advisory is not grounds for 
withdrawal of the plea but gives an exception in paragraph one if the defendant could 
show he was likely to suffer deportation and the guilty plea was likely to be considered in 
that proceeding. There was discussion as to whether this would somehow extend the 
time for making a motion to withdraw a plea. However, a motion to withdraw a plea 
would still be made under I.C.R. 33 and case law has established the jurisdictional time 
limits for this motion. The proposal speaks to a possible new ground for a motion but 
does not extend the time. 
There was a motion to amend the language in subsection one as to the immigration 
advisory so that it would simply state "the failure of the court to provide this notice shall 
not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea". This motion passed. 
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The Committee then voted to recommend to the Supreme Court the adoption of an 
amendment to Rule 11 to read as follows: 
( d) The district judge shall, prior to eutry of a guilty plea or the 
making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of 
the following collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or 
factual admissions, as follows: 
(1) The court shall inform all defeudants that if the defendaut is 
not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of 
factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or 
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United States, or denial 
of an application for United States citizenship. Failure of the court to 
provide this notice shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty 
plea. 
(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offeuse requiring 
registration ou the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the 
defendant of such notification requirements. Failure to so notify the 
defendant shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
(3) If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other post-
conviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of 
the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court shall 
confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of appeal or 
other proceedings. Failure of the court to confirm this waiver with 
the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for withdrawal of the 
guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise 
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand 
the conditions of his plea agreement. 
Guilty Plea Advisory Form. The Rule 11 subcommittee, chaired by Judge Cawthon, 
also presented a proposed plea advisory fom1 to be used by the district courts with the 
idea being there should be some uniformity across the state. The form was designed to 
be filled out by the defendant with counsel ahead of time and then submitted to the court. 
The court would then review it with the defendant. The advantage of such a fonn is 
making sure all parties understand the consequences of the plea and putting plea 
agreements clearly on the record. This will help on appeal and in post-conviction as 
well as when the voluntariness of the plea is challenged. There was discussion as to 
whether use of the form should be required and incorporated into a rule or just put in the 
bench guide as a recommendation. It was thought that this matter should be brought 
before the Administrative Conference to get their recommendation. While the 
Committee wanted some uniformity the members also wanted the district judges to 
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endorse its use. The form was based on forms that are now in use by various judges in 
different districts. 
The Committee then reviewed the form as to content and there was some concern about 
questions 17- 22 that addressed performance of defense counsel and whether the 
questions would provoke dissatisfaction with defense counsel. The subcommittee was 
asked to review the advisory again in the next 10 days and Gar Hackney and Amil 
Myshin, as well as Justice Burdick, will participate in that effort with the subcommittee. 
It will then be circulated to the Committee. The plea colloquy for felonies that is now in 
the bench guide will also be consulted. 
Rule 16. Discovery. At the meeting in January the question was raised whether Rule 16 
should be amended to require the identification in discovery of witnesses who will be 
called as experts and disclosure of the opinions they will render and the basis of those 
opinions similar to discovery allowed under the civil rules. The consensus of the 
Committee was that better disclosure would be helpful to both the prosecution and 
defense and a subcommittee, chaired by Justice Burdick, was appointed. The following 
proposal was submitted with some issues still not resolved by the members of the 
subcommittee: 
Add to Subsection (b): 
(7). Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the 
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony 
that the state intends to introduce at trial or hearing pursuant to Rules 
702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The summary provided 
must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those 
opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions 
regarding mental health shall also comply with the requirements of I.C. 
§ 18-207. The prosecution is not required to produce any materials not 
subject to disclosure under paragraph (f) of this Rule. 
Current subparagraphs (7) and (8) would be re-designated as (8) and 
(9), respectively. 
Add to Subsection (c): 
(4) Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the prosecutor the 
defendant shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony 
that the defense intends to introduce at trial or hearing pursuant to 
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The summary 
provided must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons 
for those opinions and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of 
expert opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the 
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The defense is not required to produce 
any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (g) of this 
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Rule, or any material otherwise protected from disclosure by his 
constitutional rights. 
One concern was whether the prosecutor's duty to disclose should be limited to case in 
chief and that is an area the subcommittee discussed. Prosecutors were concerned about 
when a rebuttal expert would have to be disclosed and whether the state would be unable 
to use an expert in rebuttal when it truly could not be anticipated because of a failure to 
disclose under this rule. There was also discussion about the level of detail as to the 
basis for the opinion and whether it would have to be more than what would be required 
to lay a foundation for the testimony at trial. 
A question was raised as to why depositions of these experts was not provided for in the 
rules but in criminal cases it raises a problem of witness intimidation and of expense 
when there are so many indigent defendants. 
There was a motion to recommend the adoption of the proposal but it failed with 6 votes 
in favor and 7 votes against. After a break to resolve differences, the Committee 
considered a new proposal as follows: 
Add to Subsection (b): 
(7.) Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the 
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any 
testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to Rules 702, 
703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or bearing. The 
summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and 
data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of 
expert opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the 
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The prosecution is not required to 
produce any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (f) 
of this Rule. This subsection does not require disclosure of expert 
witnesses, their opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, or the 
witness's qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories 
that have not been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial. 
Current subparagraphs (7) and (8) would be re-designated as (8) and 
(9), respectively. 
Add to Subsection (c): 
(4.) Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the prosecutor the 
defendant shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony 
that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Rules 702, 703 or 
705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The summary 
provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for 
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those opinions and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert 
opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the 
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The defense is uot required to produce 
any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (g) of this 
Rule, or auy material otherwise protected from disclosure by his 
constitutional rights. 
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend this amendment. 
Rule 34. New trial. Rule 34 states that a motion for a new trial may be made at any 
time within 14 days of "verdict, finding of guilty or imposition of sentence." A 
suggestion was made to simply make it "at any time within 14 days from the imposition 
of sentence." However, there are reasons why a defendant may want to make a motion 
right after trial before sentencing and it was believed the rule was not causing a problem 
as it now reads. A motion passed to leave this rule as it currently reads. 
Rule 5.1. Preliminary Hearings. The Committee considered a proposal to consider 
changing the time frame set out in Rule 5.l(a) for preliminary hearings from 14 days for 
those in custody and 21 days for those not in custody to 21 and 28 days. The reason being 
that this is not enough time for discovery and it causes too many continuances. 
However, the consensus was that a seven day extension would not solve this problem. It 
was also recognized that this often provides an opportunity for a contested bond hearing. 
A motion passed to leave this rule as it currently reads. 
Rule 5 (h). First appearance on indictment by grand jury. There was a proposal to 
amend this rule to provide that a district judge may also arraign a defendant on a grand 
jury indictment. This allows any judge to act based on availability. The Committee 
voted to recommend the following amendment: 
A defendant arrested on a warrant issued pursuant to an indictment by grand jury shall be 
taken before a magistrate judge or district court judge in that judicial district without 
unreasonable delay. In no event shall the delay be more than twenty-four (24) hours 
following the arrest excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. The magistrate judge or 
district court judge shall have the authority to set bail and shall advise the defendant: 
Rule 33. The Committee voted to recommend a housekeeping amendment to remove 
some extra language that appears in the last line of ( d) of the rule, as follows: 
"The conditions of a withheld judgment or probation may also include, among other 
lawful provisions, the following: withholding judgment, conditions." 
Inmate requests for disposition of intrastate charges. There was discussion as to 
whether a special rule was needed to deal with these requests. The consensus was that 
these cases were being resolved in a timely manner and that there was no problem at this 
time requiring a special rule. Sara Thomas volunteered to track this for future discussion. 
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Probation Violations. There was also discussion as to whether a special rule was 
needed to address probation violations. It was noted that these may be treated differently 
in different counties. Some do the arraignment in 24 hours excluding holidays and 
weekends and actually that is what Rule 5 (b) provides, "Place of initial appearance. A 
defendant arrested, whether or not pursuant to a warrant, including a probation violator 
arrested on an agents warrant pursuant to I.C. § Section 20-227, shall be taken before a 
magistrate in that judicial district without unreasonable delay. In no event shall the delay 
be more than twenty-four (24) hours following the arrest excluding Saturdays, Sundays, 
and holidays." In some counties it was thought that violators might be sitting and 
waiting for a set calendar date dealing with probation violations; however, none of the 
members were aware of any specific problems and so no action was taken. 
The meeting adjourned at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
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